Editor’s Note
This article outlines the core function of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the international mechanism designed to halt the trade in conflict diamonds. It explains how participant countries enforce the system by certifying compliant rough diamond shipments.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is the mechanism to prevent the trade of conflict diamonds, which is enforced individually by KP participant countries to ensure that rough diamonds in the legitimate supply chain are KP-compliant. Each consignment is accompanied by a KP certificate corroborated by a participant country. The rough diamonds trade is permitted only between certified KP members who comply fully with these international standards. Additionally, participant countries are obliged to share timely and accurate statistical data for diamond production and trade.
Angola, Botswana, Canada, Congo, Namibia and Russia alone account for more than 85% of the production of rough diamonds, in quantity and value terms. Though India is not a producer, it is a major importer of rough diamonds, importing roughly 40% of the total global imports, both in quantity and value. As the world’s leading cutting and polishing hub, centered in Surat and Mumbai, India re-exports polished diamonds to major markets which include China, Hong Kong, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. India’s strategic position, at the heart of the global diamond value chain, gives it unique leverage within the KP to steer meaningful reforms in global diamond governance.
The KP, a tripartite setup of governments, industry organisations and civil society, faces much criticism and challenges. First, a long-standing criticism is about the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’. Its scope is very narrow, capturing only the financial mechanism between rebel groups and governments, while ignoring the illicit use of rough diamonds in state-linked abuses, human rights violations and human trafficking, environmental harm, abuses in artisanal mining, and illicit trade channels.
There are also fundamental questions about the decision-making process. Civil society asks how the KP can ever identify ‘conflict diamonds’ if any such decision is subject to political veto. Under the current system, any determination can be blocked. What happens when the KP identifies conflict diamonds?